DOVER - A prison task force report made public Friday by Gov. Ruth Ann Minner criticized the Department of Correction for serious security lapses at the Delaware Correctional Center and made numerous recommendations for improvements.

Meanwhile, the Correctional Officer's Association of Delaware, which represents most DOC rank-and-file, praised the report, saying it agrees with the recommendations, with only minor exceptions.

Gov. Minner created the panel after DOC released an internal review of the July 12, 2004, abduction and rape of prison counselor Cassandra Arnold by serial rapist Scott A. Miller. The DOC report offered no conclusions and held no one accountable for the incident at the prison near Smyrna.

The nearly seven-hour ordeal in DCC's Building 24 ended when a correctional officer shot and killed Miller as he was trying to stab Ms. Arnold with a knife.

The task force report contains at least 45 recommendations, including conducting a complete review of outdated, incomplete and/or insufficient DCC standard operating procedures.

Other recommendations focus on reclassifying correctional officer pay scales to improve job retention and recruitment, giving management more flexibility to meet staffing needs, securing better and more effective equipment, more training, and clarifying potential confusion about the use of deadly force.

'Force' examined

Although Correctional Officer Keith Hoffer shot and killed Miller after the inmate raped Ms. Arnold and seconds before he could stab her, the task force questioned the process used to authorize the use of deadly force.

"...The issue boils down to the fact that it is not enough under Delaware law for the commissioner to order deadly force, if the shooter does not independently and subjectively believe there is a danger to himself, his team or to the hostage to justify force,'' the report says.

"The task force recommends the attorney general's office and DOC work together on this issue to ensure there is clarity going forward and all DOC and DCC policies regarding the use of force and lethal force are consistent.''

Negotiation woes

The report says hostage negotiators were not given information that could have been critical in resolving the situation before Ms. Arnold was assaulted.

It says negotiators never knew about a note Miller left behind in his cell indicating that he no longer had any reason to live.

"I am going to end my life,'' Miller wrote on a prison newspaper. "I have nothing to lose. No reason or excuse to live.''

Negotiators also were not told that Miller's ex-wife called DCC during the standoff to tell them that she told Miller she would not visit him in prison again or bring their children to visit again.

"She reported that Miller was very angry and 'promised her a birthday present' she would not forget,'' the report says.

"The task force recommends that an immediate and thorough search of the cell of an inmate involved in any incident such as this be standard protocol.

"...The information about inmate Miller's wife and children should have been conveyed to the hostage negotiating team. The negotiators needed to know that this was a sensitive subject and they needed to understand that inmate Miller was in a self-destructive frame of mind.''

The panel criticized negotiators for not knowing the contents of a note sent to Miller in which DCC Warden Thomas Carroll said he would not meet with him until he released Ms. Arnold.

"As the day progressed. Miller eventually demanded to meet the warden in the presence of the media," the report says.

"It was the judgment of everyone interviewed that producing the warden to inmate Miller would be a huge mistake. The universal fear was that Miller would do something dramatic in the face of the warden, especially in the presence of the media, such as kill Ms. Arnold in front of him and/or kill or take the warden hostage.''

The report says a decision was reached to send Miller a one-sentence message from Mr. Carroll instead.

"I agree to speak directly with you about your complaints upon the safe release of counselor Cassie Arnold,'' the letter said.

Although negotiators told Miller a letter from the warden was coming, the report says they were not aware of its content when they slipped it under the door to the barricaded room Miller and Ms. Arnold were in.

"Miller's reaction to the letter was bad and the negotiators scrambled to explain what the letter meant and tried to convince Miller the letter was a positive development,'' the report says.

"Soon thereafter the room 'went quiet,' and the negotiators became very concerned.''

After receiving the letter, Miller bound Ms. Arnold and raped her.

"The delivery of the letter was, by all accounts, a culmination of negotiations and although indications from inmate Miller at that time were positive, ... Miller had proved throughout the day that his mood could turn quickly,'' the report says.

The panel also questioned the qualifications of the lead negotiators and suggested more experienced personnel should have been called in.

"The task force recognizes this is a difficult issue as the department must, to some extent, play the cards it is dealt in cases like these,'' the report says.

"(The task force) recommends DOC review this matter to establish a mechanism to ensure that lead negotiators in a hostage situation are affirmatively placed in that role based on a prior well-thought assessment of their abilities. In short, this is no place for on-the-job training.''

Other concerns

The task force said it was unable to get information from the correctional officer manning the security control booth in Building 24 because she quit her job shortly after the July 12 incident and declined to be interviewed.

The panel did say, however, that there are too many responsibilities for one person in that position during peak hours.

"The task force recommends hereafter that two correctional officers be assigned to the control pod during peak hours,'' the report says.

The panel found shakedowns and strip searches of inmates are conducted only randomly.

"The task force believes a combination of regular complete shakedowns, body searches and metal detection equipment at all points of ingress and egress to Building 24, as well as constant vigilance to keep potential contraband out of the hands of the inmate population is required,'' the report says.

Panel members said DCC's standard operating procedures are woefully lacking.

"Upon reviewing numerous standard operating procedures and post orders, the task force found that they generally fell into one or more of three undesirable categories,'' the reports says.

"They were either outdated, too vague to be useful, or not relevant. Staff in many instances did not follow much of what they contained or were unaware of their existence.''

Although DCC requires a yearly review of all policies and procedures, the task force said there's no evidence "any type of annual review has occurred for at least the last 10 years.''

The report says "DCC should conduct a complete review and update of all standard operation procedures and post orders, clearly defining the responsibilities of its correctional staff for each post and promote staff accountability by requiring staff members to sign off after reviewing a set of post orders.''

The panel determined, through numerous interviews with rank-and-file, that DOC senior management rarely visit inmate incarceration areas.

"DOC should require the wardens and deputy wardens to make periodic, frequent unannounced tours of the various facilities, particularly DCC,'' the report says. "The commissioner and the bureau chief should do so as well.''

Furthermore, the report says "audits and security inspections should be unannounced and periodically conducted on all three shifts, not only on weekdays but also on weekends.''

While finding that by DOC's inmate classification standards, Miller was placed at the proper security level, the task force said a complete reassessment of the system is in order.

"A comprehensive re-assessment of all instruments and processes should occur to determine whether the measuring standards currently in use are the best predictors of inmate behavior,'' the report says.

"The review and re-assessment should be conducted by an external entity and should include an examination of the disciplinary records of each inmate classified under the new system.''

COAD praise

COAD President Paul Smith said union leadership agrees with the great majority of the report's contents and looks forward to helping make the recommendations a reality.

"We would like to thank the task force for its in-depth report and commend the members on their efforts during the short time span they had to work with,'' Mr. Smith said.

"We look forward to working in a concerted manner with the governor, legislature, commissioner and DOC as we move forward in our efforts to implement the findings of this task force report.''

Mr. Smith there are only a "few little things'' in the report that COAD wants further discussion on.

One, he said, is a recommendation that DOC be given

more flexibility as to how shifts are staffed in the prison system.

The task force noted that in the previous union contract, which has expired, shifts are assigned based on seniority, meaning that more-senior officers can "decide when and where they will work.''

The report says that process often results in "certain shifts at the most potentially dangerous institutions being manned predominately by correctional officers with the least experience.''

"This is not a healthy situation,'' the report continues. "The state must restore the proper balance within the institution in terms of appropriate levels of experience on the various shifts.''

The full task force report can be viewed on the Internet at state.de.us/governor/dccreport.

Recommendations

Gov. Ruth Ann Minner's prison task force made at least 45 recommendations to help overcome security lapses at the Delaware Correctional Center near Smyrna. Here are some key points:

* Diminish reliance on overtime in favor of alternative shifts, reduce correctional officer vacancies via better pay to aid recruitment and retention, and/or decrease workload by reducing inmate population

* Make control pod operation a specialty function, require specific training and add at least one additional officer during peak hours

* Inventory equipment annually for quantity and quality, and enhance as appropriate

* Increase training curriculum

* Add more in-prison cameras to monitor prison population

* Establish better accountability with automated internal information systems

* Allow management more flexibility in staffing shifts and creating alternative shift scenarios

* Study the feasibility of a wireless communication system network for the entire prison system

* Enhance equipment used to detect inmate contraband within the prisons

* Conduct a full review of the inmate classification system

* Conduct a complete update and review of all standard operating procedures and post orders

* Consider creating a deputy warden for security position, responsible for all security within the prison

* Review and update policy on the use of deadly force

* Increase communication between rank-and-file and senior DOC administrators, with regular visits by senior officials, including the commissioner

Source: Task Force on Security Issues at the Delaware Correctional Center

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Senior writer Tom Eldred can be reached at 741-8212 or teldred@newzap.com.