Report blasts DCC security

 

'Significant breakdown' led to July hostage incident
By Tom Eldred, Delaware State News



DOVER - Delaware's largest prison has deep-seated administrative, staffing and security deficiencies that must be addressed as soon as possible.

That's the consensus of an independent task force created last October by Gov. Ruth Ann Minner in the wake of a July 12 incident at the Delaware Correctional Center near Smyrna. On that day a female counselor was raped before the inmate who abducted and assaulted her was shot and killed by a correctional officer.

The group's final report, delivered to the governor Monday, was released by her office Friday.

"The members of the task force have provided a thorough, detailed and well-written report,'' Gov. Minner said in a prepared statement announcing the report was released and available on the Internet.

"It cannot be summarized easily or concisely and I will not attempt to do so, except to say that on July 12, 2004, there were many areas in which our personnel performed admirably under extraordinary circumstances.


"However, there are other areas where the Department of Correction could have done a better job, both that day and in the weeks and months leading up to it.''

Commissioner of Corrections Stanley W. Taylor commended the report in a conference call interview with reporters.

"It was a pretty difficult task,'' he said. "I think they did a pretty good job with it. Some things we're proud of. Some things we're not proud of.''

Mr. Taylor also revealed that he had offered his resignation to Gov. Minner last year after the hostage-taking incident but that she refused to accept it.

The 90-page report, plus dozens of graphs and charts, focuses on the incident in which counselor Cassandra Arnold, after completing a stress management class, was taken hostage in a nonsecure administrative area of Building 24 at DCC by inmate Scott A. Miller.



Miller, a serial rapist serving 699 years in prison for multiple assaults against women, pulled a homemade knife or "shank,'' on Ms. Arnold after she noticed him hiding in a bathroom in a hallway near her office.

Holding the shank to her throat, Miller pulled Ms. Arnold into the bathroom and then across a hallway into her office. Then he barricaded the door and kept rescuers at bay for nearly seven hours until he was shot and killed by correctional officer Keith Hoffer.

According to the report, Officer Hoffer shot Miller twice from an adjoining room's false ceiling moments after he observed Miller raping Ms. Arnold and as Miller was attempting to kill her.

"Having been shot twice, Miller fell on Ms. Arnold, who grabbed his right arm and pried away the shank, as (officers) came crashing through the drop ceiling into the room,'' the report says.

"The task force concludes that Ms. Arnold, in the face of incredible danger, maintained her composure throughout this horrific event and her actions were instrumental in saving her life.''

Rating the players

In a summary of its work, the task force said it conducted 52 individual interviews, heard from many rank-and-file officers anonymously and in open meetings, and reviewed more than 5,700 documents provided by DOC and other sources.

The report commended Officer Hoffer and other members of DOC's Correctional Emergency Response Term (CERT) for their "excellent" performance, saying that with all of the controversy surrounding the incident, their efforts were not properly noted.

The task force gave Mr. Taylor and other DOC administrators operating from a command center during the crisis "good'' marks but rated the hostage negotiating team dealing with Miller only "fair.''

"While the performance of the (negotiators) that day must be measured, in part, by the end result, which could have been much worse, the task force finds their performance to be only fair,'' the report says.



"The task force was troubled by the fact that certain critical information was not in the hands of the negotiators or the command center.

"Finally, the task force finds the security in Building 24 leading up to the incident was marked by complacency on the part of both staff and management, with shortcuts designed to override security protections far too common.

"As such, the task force concludes that the performance of DCC management and staff leading up to the incident was poor.''

Failures identified

In the meat of the report, the task force details insufficient staffing, inflexible management, outdated policies and procedures at DCC and the "simple failure of both management and staff to address and correct security breaches.''

The report scrutinizes DOC overtime polices and notes that with a workforce approaching a 25-percent vacancy rate, DCC has increased its reliance on "freezing'' officers into back-to-back 8-hour work shifts to meet minimum staffing needs.

According to DOC, there are 339 vacant correctional officer positions statewide, including 53 officers on military leave.

"The task force finds excessive reliance upon overtime (whether voluntary or by freezing) reduces morale, which increases turnover and otherwise leads to numerous security breakdowns, as tired staff fall victim to complacency,'' the report says.

"As such, the task force recommends the state reclassify the correctional officer series across the board to increase and improve recruitment and retention, while decreasing reliance on overtime.''

Security the issue

The report makes dozens of recommendations - from equipment upgrades and improved communications to better training to reassessment of the classification system used to determine appropriate inmate incarceration levels - but ultimately the focus is security.

"The task force concludes that there was a significant breakdown in basic prison security practices and procedures within (Building 24) that compromised the safety of staff and inmates on the day of the incident and for quite some time prior to that day,'' the reports says.

"The warden, deputy warden and their senior manager were unaware of the many security breaches in the (building) because in large part, they rarely toured the complex,'' the report says.

"As a result, they all lacked first-hand knowledge of the way in which the (building) was operating and unfortunately relied heavily on written reports that, in most cases, did not accurately reflect the significant violations of basic security practices that needed to be corrected.

"It does not appear that the warden, deputy warden, and senior managers have the command and control that is essential in this type of environment.''

Complacency woes

Mr. Taylor, calling the report "very thorough and comprehensive,'' said DOC will take the recommendations seriously and try to analyze what can be accomplished in-house, with available funding, and what may have to be outsourced.

He said he agreed with most of the findings, except criticism of the hostage negotiating team.

"I think the hostage negotiators did a very good job,'' he said. "They bought very valuable time. That's critical in these episodes.''

He said complacency in the workplace is an ongoing problem.

"That's something that creeps in 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and 365 days a year,'' he said. "That problem starts at the line level and works its way up through the ranks to administration as well.

"The battle against complacency and security lapses is one we fight all the time. That responsibility is broadly felt. I'll take my share of the blame for that.''

In response to a reporter's question, Mr. Taylor said he offered his resignation to Gov. Minner in "late summer or early fall'' last year in the months after the July 12 incident but that she refused to accept it.

He also said he takes full responsibility for the failures identified in the task force report.

Gregory B. Patterson, a spokesman for Gov. Minner, confirmed Mr. Taylor offered to resign and that the governor refused the offer. He said Gov. Minner was not available for comment Friday.

Mr. Taylor promised a full analysis of the report's recommendations but stressed there is no such thing as absolute security in prisons.

"In this business there is no such thing as a guarantee,'' he said. "What we do is to operate as safely and securely as possible to keep the odds in our favor.

"It's one of the dangers of the job we have to recognize and then do everything in our power to prevent.''

Ms. Arnold said she read the report when it was released Friday.

"I think the report is well worded and contains a lot of great recommendations,'' she said. "I hope they do them and not just leave them on paper.''

Jeffrey K. Martin, an attorney for Ms. Arnold, praised the report but said he disagrees with a section that says Ms. Arnold should not have confronted Miller in the hallway without calling for backup first.

"She did not break stride when she passed Miller in that bathroom,'' he said. "It happened instantaneously.''

Ms. Arnold concurred. "My backup was that I was screaming and screaming for help,'' she said.

In her prepared statement, Gov. Minner said the public can access the full task force report online at state.de.us/governor/dccreport.

She said the report represents an important start in a collaborative effort to "ensure that working conditions at DCC and throughout the correctional system are as safe as humanly possible.

"For anyone with an interest in this report, I would urge that they not only rely on the media's or anyone else's summary of it,'' she continued.

"It is a document that can only be properly judged in total, not in pieces.''

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Senior writer Tom Eldred can be reached at 741-8212 or at teldred@newszap.com.


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